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He was born in Germantown, Pennsylvania, the son of
Thomas S. Gates Sr., an investment banker who was president of the University
of Pennsylvania from 1930 to 1944. Gates graduated from the University of
Pennsylvania in 1928, then joined the investment banking firm of Drexel and
Company in Philadelphia and became a partner in 1940.
During World War II he served in the Navy, rose to the rank of lieutenant
commander, and participated in campaigns in the Pacific and Mediterranean
areas. He was released from active duty in October 1945.
From December 2, 1959 - January 20, 1961 he was the 7th Secretary of Defense
(Eisenhower Administration).
Gates was sworn in as secretary of defense on an interim appointment on 2
December 1959 and confirmed by the Senate on 26 January 1960. He was born in
Germantown, Pennsylvania, on 10 April 1906, the son of an investment banker
who served at one time as president of the University of Pennsylvania. Gates
graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1928, then joined the
investment banking firm of Drexel and Company in Philadelphia and became a
partner in 1940. During World War II he served in the Navy, rose to the rank
of lieutenant commander, and participated in campaigns in the Pacific and
Mediterranean areas. He was released from active duty in October 1945.
President Eisenhower appointed Gates under Secretary of the Navy in October
1953 and Secretary on 1 April 1957, positions in which he earned the
president's approval. It was a foregone conclusion when Gates became
McElroy's deputy on 8 June 1959 that he would succeed him. He entered office
with an impressive background of active military experience and more than six
years in the Department of Defense.
As a top-level DoD official since 1953, Gates was familiar with the 1953 and
1958 changes in Defense organization. Believing that the Secretary of Defense
had all the authority he needed and that time should be allowed for
evaluation of the longrange effects of the 1958 amendments, he discouraged
efforts to further revamp the department. As a former secretary of the Navy
who had observed the gradual downgrading of service secretary positions, he
felt that the service secretaries should play a more important role, and he
encouraged them to do so.
Gates cultivated a good working relationship with the JCS. Less than a month
after becoming secretary, he reminded the chiefs of their responsibility to
apprise him of disputes and proposed to meet with them in order to expedite
settlement or bring the issue to the president's attention for final
resolution. Soon Gates and the JCS met on a regular basis, not just in
instances when the Chiefs disagreed. Congressional and other sources
applauded Gates for taking the initiative in improving both the JCS
organization and the secretary's relations with it.
Another important Gates initiative was the creation in August 1960 of the
Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS). Previously, inadequate
coordination of targeting plans between the Strategic Air Command and the
Navy led to redundancy and disputed priorities. These differences became
especially significant with the advent of the Navy's sea-based Polaris
ballistic missiles. Acting on a proposal by SAC Commander in Chief General
Thomas S. Power that SAC control strategic weapons targeting, Gates set up
the JSTPS. The SAC commander, supported by an integrated joint staff, assumed
separate duties as director of strategic target planning, to be, as Gates
indicated, "the planning agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
developing and keeping up to date the detailed plans which are
necessary." When Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke
objected to the new arrangement, Gates encouraged him to argue his case with
President Eisenhower, who ultimately upheld Gates's decision. Thereafter
Burke supported the JSTPS and assigned to it highly qualified naval officers.
By December 1960 the JSTPS had prepared the first Single Integrated
Operational Plan (SIOP), which specified for various attack options the
timing, weapons, delivery systems, and targets to be used by U.S. strategic
forces.
Gates devoted more time than Wilson and McElroy to the development of basic
defense policy, a sphere in which the president remained dominant. While he
instituted no radical departure from the New Look approach, the changing
nature of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, the related assumed need for
continental defense systems, and the pressing question of how to respond to
local or "limited" wars, dictated a gradual shift in defense
policy. As Gates pointed out at a congressional hearing in January 1960, the
two principal U.S. defense objectives were "to deter the outbreak of
general war by maintaining and improving our present capability to retaliate
with devastating effectiveness in case of a major attack upon us or our
allies" and "to maintain, together with our allies, a capability to
apply to local situations the degree of force necessary to deter local wars,
or to win or contain them promptly if they do break out." Gates saw no
clear distinction between general war and limited war forces. As he put it,
"All forces are a deterrent to and would be employed in a general war.
Most of our forces could be employed in a limited war, if required." He
noted as an example that aircraft carriers "are probably the country's
best limited war capability initially because they are deployed in the
world's trouble zones and they have on-the-spot ability to react"; yet,
he added, they could contribute to the strategic offensive forces during
general war.
During Gates's tenure two missile elementsthe ICBM and the submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM)joined the manned bomber to form a "triad"
of strategic nuclear delivery systems. Also during this period, there
occurred movement toward greater emphasis on counterforcetargeting a
potential enemy's military installations and forces. Not only was the United
States developing or beginning to deploy a variety of missile systems during
this periodAtlas, Titan, Minuteman, and Polarisbut so was the Soviet Union.
The USSR's emphasis on the land-based ICBM rather than the manned bomber as
its primary strategic delivery system presaged a threat of such magnitude to
the United States that, together with the Sputnik shock, it forced an
acceleration in the pace of U.S. missile development.
Gates, like McElroy, had to contend with the "missile gap"
controversy. He regarded it as a false issue, based on the failure of missile
gap believers to distinguish between space and military programs. When the
U.S. long-range ballistic missile program began in the early 1950s, Gates
observed, the development of small, lightweight nuclear warheads by American scientists
made it possible for smaller ballistic missiles to carry them. The Russians,
on the other hand, concentrated on very large boosters that they used to
launch space satellites earlier than the United States. Gates told a House
committee, "We are not behind the Russians in our military effort
overall . . . . It is one thing to admit you are behind in the ability to put
big payloads in space for which we have at the moment no military
requirement, and another thing to admit that we are behind in our total
military posture." Gates conceded that the Soviets might have more
strategic missiles than the United States for a few years, perhaps peaking in
1962, but he denied that there was a real missile or deterrent gap; the
Soviets would not "gain a strategic posture which might tempt them to
initiate a surprise attack." Gates based his thinking in part on a
debatable approach to intelligence estimates, which took account of Soviet
intentions as well as capabilities, leading to the conclusion that the disparity
between the number of Soviet and U.S. missiles by 1962 or 1963 would not be
as great as estimated during the McElroy period.
Like all of his predecessors, Gates supported U.S. participation in
collective security pacts and military assistance programs. He identified
NATO as the nucleus of the U.S. "forward strategy." As he put it,
"Should we ever abandon our forward strategy in favor of the so-called
'Fortress America' concept, we would retreat forever." He urged Congress
to continue adequate funding for military assistance, which had brought very
high returns for the money spent.
Perhaps the most spectacular event of Gates's administration occurred on 1
May 1960 when the Soviet Union shot down over its territory a U-2
reconnaissance aircraft piloted by Francis Gary Powers. When Soviet Premier
Nikita Khrushchev announced the incident four days later and accused the
United States of spying, the Eisenhower administration initially suggested
that the plane might have strayed into Soviet airspace. On the recommendation
of representatives from State and Defense, including Gates, President
Eisenhower later admitted that the U-2 was on an intelligence-gathering
mission (actually under CIA control) and assumed responsibility for the
flight. In mid-May Gates accompanied Eisenhower to Paris for a summit meeting
that had been scheduled prior to the U-2 affair. There Khrushchev demanded
termination of all U.S. flights over the Soviet Union, an apology, and
punishment of those responsible. Eisenhower indicated that the flights would
not be resumed but rejected the other demands, whereupon Khrushchev refused
to proceed with the summit meeting. Gates suggested later that the Russian
leader used the U-2 crisis to abort a meeting that he had determined in
advance would not result in gains for the Soviet Union.
On the eve of the summit conference, Gates ordered a worldwide alert of U.S.
military communications facilities a decision criticized by some as
provocative. Stoutly defending his action, Gates later explained that he
decided, with the concurrence of Eisenhower and Secretary of State Christian
A. Herter, to call the alert when he became aware of the belligerent position
Khrushchev intended to take when the summit convened the next day.
"Under the circumstances," Gates said, "it seemed most prudent
to me to increase the awareness of our unified commanders. Moreover, since
the command and individuals concerned in the decision process, including the
President, the Secretary of State, and myself, were overseas, it was important
to check out our military communications."
Although Gates adhered to the usual budget posture and strategy of the
Eisenhower administration, there was 8.2 percent real growth in DoD's FY 1961
budget after Congress completed its work. Total obligational authority
amounted to $44.6 billion, almost $4.4 billion over the previous year. The
bulk of the increase went to the Navy and the Air Force. Gates pressed for an
appropriation of $2 billion for military assistance, most of which Congress
provided. To criticism of the Eisenhower administration's continuing efforts
to hold down the DoD budget, Gates replied that the department was spending
enough money to meet the nation's vital security needs.
In a lengthy statement entitled "Department of Defense, 1953-1960,"
prepared at the close of Gates's tenure, the Department of Defense summarized
its accomplishments during the Eisenhower years, concluding that "today
our armed forces have the greatest striking power in our historymany times
greater than in 1953." Among other accomplishments, it cited development
of medium- and long-range bombers (including the B-52s put into service
during the 1950s) and ICBMs; installation of a continental defense system the
Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
(BMEWS), and Nike surface-to-air missile systems; production of several
nuclear submarines, beginning with the Nautilus in 1954, and Forrestal-type
carriers; and creation of the Defense Communications Agency.
Gates retired from office on 20 January 1961. There were those who regarded
him as the first of a new breed of secretaries of defense who would take a
more active management approachevidenced by his regular meetings with the JCS
and establishment of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. Gates, of
course, had the advantages of long prior service in DoD and the expanded
authority of the office resulting from the 1953 and 1958 reorganizations.
Although President Eisenhower continued to be, as during the Wilson and
McElroy periods, the chief author of defense policy and the ultimate
decision-maker, Gates appeared to operate with more authority and
independence than his immediate predecessors, especially in areas such as
strategic policy and planning. It is notable that after John F. Kennedy's
election to the presidency in 1960 the press speculated that he might include
a Republican in his cabinet and that if so, Gates would be high on the list
of possible appointees.
After he left the Pentagon, Gates joined Morgan and Company in New York,
later the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, becoming president in 1962 and
chairman and chief executive officer in 1965. President Richard M. Nixon
appointed him chairman of the Advisory Commission on an All-Volunteer Force,
which presented its influential report in November 1969. In 1976-77 he
served, with the rank of ambassador, as chief of the United States Liaison
Office in the People's Republic of China. He died in Philadelphia at age 76
on 25 March 1983.
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Thomas S. Gates (CG-51) was laid down by Bath Iron
Works, Bath, Maine 31 August 1984; launched 14 December 1985; and
commissioned 22 August 1987.
In Fall 1998, she underwent the first installation ship
in the U.S. Navy's Integrated Ship Controls (ISC) Program. This upgrade
program aimed to install innovative labor and cost savings initiatives on the
first four Aegis cruisers (CG-47 to 51). Many of the technologies installed
are the result of the initiatives proven sucessful on Yorktown (CG 48). The
upgrade program also included options to install systems on the remaining
twenty-two Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers.
During Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Thomas S. Gates
conducted operations in the Maritime Intercept Force, and under the command
of Destroyer Squadron 36, the Red Sea escort cruiser played a decisive role
in maritime interceptions. In 1998 it was reported that her hull showed signs
of warping.
Thomas S. Gates deployed in late July 2000 to serve as
the flagship for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standing Naval
Forces Atlantic (SNFL). The ship hosted an international professional naval
staff made up of officers from Germany, Poland, Spain, Norway, the
Netherlands, Great Britain and Canada. SNFL fills a very important role in
the NATO military command structure. It is a permanently established
multinational force which conducts routine presence and surveillance missions
as well as providing a maritime Immediate Reaction Force. If needed, SNFL is
prepared to deploy to crisis areas in support of NATO objectives. As
STANAVFORLANT, the ship's first exercise was DANEX 2000.
Ship personnel were to also participate in cross-deck
opportunities with the other NATO ships and, as well, have the opportunity to
visit Finland, a non-NATO nation, and Poland. Ports visited during this
deployment were Oslo, Norway; Helsinki, Finland; Copenhagen, Denmark; Gdynia,
Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Leithe, Scotland; Plymouth, U.K.; Plymouth,
U.K.; Brest, France; Santander, Spain.
Thomas S. Gates left its homeport at Naval Station
Pascagoula, Pascagoula, Miss., for a five-month deployment 10 March 2004. The
deployment was to cover a variety of missions, including a circumnavigation
of the South American continent. Gates’ deployment will include counter-drug
operations, high-profile port visits along the eastern Atlantic seaboard;
escorting the nation’s newest carrier, Ronald Reagan (CVN-76), to her new
homeport in San Diego; and international exercises with South American navy
ships. Gates’ eastern seaboard tour will include a visit to New London, Conn.
On 21 March 2004, in the Caribbean Sea, Thomas S. Gates
and its embarked USCG Law Enforcement Detachment 101 were involved in the
capture of a suspected organized crime group leader; Jose Miguel Battle. They
intercepted the cruise ship Celebrity Summit on its way to Costa Rica in the
middle of the night and affected his capture. She returned to Pascagoula on 2
August 2004 after her five month deployment.
Due to Hurricane Katrina, her last deployment was
cut short. The Navy decommissioned her on 15 December 2005, four months
earlier than the planned March, 2006 date. She was stricken the same date and
is now slated to be dismantled in the next five years along with her sisters
Vincennes and Yorktown.
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